Equilibrium Pricing When Only Some Goods Are Advertised by Witness Simbanegavi
          











Equilibrium Pricing When Only 








Working Paper Number 35 
                                                 




We study how price advertising of a subset of products a⁄ects equilibrium pricing
and advertising under low and high product di⁄erentiation. We ￿nd that, when ￿rms
sell products with the same reservation price, loss-leader pricing obtains only when
di⁄erentiation is low. However, when reservation prices di⁄er, equilibrium may entail
loss-leader pricing when di⁄erentiation is high. This enables us to shed some light on
the seemingly paradoxical empirical ￿ndings in the marketing literature that loss-leader
pricing fails to increase store tra¢ c, loss-leader sales and hence to increase pro￿ts.
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1 Introduction
The e⁄ect of advertising on prices has long been a subject of great interest to economists.
Important contributions include Benham (1972) who ￿nds, in an empirical study of the
eyeglass market, that advertising is associated with lower prices; Butters (1977) who provides
the ￿rst equilibrium analysis of price advertising and Grossman and Shapiro (1984) who
study price advertising in a Hotelling model. Grossman and Shapiro assume full market
coverage (all informed consumers make a purchase) and that ￿rms each sell a single product.
They show that, in oligopoly markets, higher advertising is associated with lower prices.
It is, however, well established that many ￿rms advertise only a subset of the products
they sell ￿a supermarket, for instance, advertises a handful of prices but sells hundreds of
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1products.1 What is the e⁄ect on prices of advertising only a subset of products? Milyo
and Waldfogel (1999)￿ s empirical study of the e⁄ect of price advertising on prices suggests
that prices of unadvertised products are higher when advertising is allowed. Theoretically,
little is known. Indeed, in his extensive survey, Bagwell (2003; p. 51) writes, "Recent work,
however, suggests that the distinction between the e⁄ect of advertising on the prices of
advertised and unadvertised products warrants greater attention".
The goal of this paper is to deepen our understanding of the e⁄ects of price advertising
when ￿rms advertise only a subset of their products. We study price advertising under two
product di⁄erentiation regimes, namely, "low" and "high" di⁄erentiation. We consider two
￿rms, each selling two products but only advertising a single product. Advertising messages
are randomly distributed over consumers, who are assumed to be uninformed about prices
and ￿rm locations unless they are reached by advertising.
We show that the existence of loss-leader pricing crucially depends on how strong com-
petition between the ￿rms is.2 In particular, for su¢ ciently low distance (di⁄erentiation)
between ￿rms, the advertised good is priced below cost, otherwise the advertised good is
priced above cost. We provide exact conditions (on the level of di⁄erentiation) where the
pricing strategy changes from prices above cost to loss leader pricing. By emphasizing the
role of the degree of product di⁄erentiation, we shed some light on the seemingly paradoxical
￿ndings of Walters and MacKenzie (1988) of a "weak" link between loss leader pricing and
store tra¢ c and pro￿ts.
Closely related are Lal and Matutes (1994) who study equilibrium pricing by multiprod-
uct ￿rms and Ellison (2005) who studies a vertically di⁄erentiated goods model in which
￿rms only advertise the low quality good. However, neither Lal and Matutes nor Ellison
explicitly model the advertising decision. In reality, advertising is an important strategic
tool. Modelling the advertising decision allows us to study the interaction between adver-
tising and prices. Moreover, both Lal and Matutes (1994) and Ellison (2005) only consider
the case where the market is fully covered. However, as Soberman (2004) show, for some
constellations of the di⁄erentiation parameter, some informed consumers ￿nd it pro￿table
not to purchase.3
1We take it as a given that ￿rms advertise only a subset of their products. Ellison (2005; pages 607-611)
discusses some of the reasons why ￿rms may want to advertise only a subset of their products.
2A good is termed a loss leader if it is priced below marginal cost.
3Also related is Bagwell and Ramey (1994) who show that "ostensibly uninformative" advertising may
bring about coordination economies. We di⁄er with them in several ways; First, in our model, advertising
2The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the model. We analyze the model
in section 3. Section 4 examines welfare implications and section 5 concludes.
2 Model and Preliminaries
Our model is an extension of the Grossman and Shapiro (1984) model to multiproduct
￿rms. We consider a linear city of unit length served by two ￿rms, 1 and 2; located at points
0 and 1 respectively. Each ￿rm sells two independent products, product 1 and product
2. However, across ￿rms, the products are substitutes.4 Firms advertise only one (and
the same) good and advertising is truthful. Firms randomly sent out advertisements to
consumers. Let ￿i denote the advertising (ad) reach of ￿rm i;i = 1;2: The cost of reaching
fraction ￿i of consumers is denoted A(￿i); where A0 > 0 and A00 > 0. For what follows, let
A(￿i) = a￿
2
i=2;a > t=2. Each good is produced at a constant marginal cost, c; and ￿rms
simultaneously and non-cooperatively choose prices and advertising intensities to maximize
pro￿ts. There is no entry or exit and there are no ￿xed costs.
Consumers are uniformly distributed on [0;1]. That is, each consumer is identi￿ed by
a point on the unit interval that corresponds to her most preferred brand. Consumers are
uninformed about prices and ￿rm locations unless they are reached by advertising. Each
informed consumer buys at most one unit of each product and uninformed consumers stay
out of the market. A unit of good 1(2) generates gross surplus of v1(v2) and consumers
incur a shopping cost of t per unit distance. Whenever they ￿nd it pro￿table to purchase,
partially informed consumers buy both goods from the same store. This, however, is not
obvious with fully informed consumers.5
Given the advertising intensities, ￿1 and ￿2; the market is delineated as follows: Fraction





;i;j = 1;2;j 6= i receive ads from ￿rm i but not ￿rm j and hence
are partially informed. Fraction (1 ￿ ￿1)(1 ￿ ￿2) receive no ads from either ￿rm and are
thus uninformed. We assume that ￿1￿2 is large enough so that ￿rms ￿nd it worthwhile to
is (directly) informative whereas in theirs, it is not. Secondly, whereas in our model ￿rms advertise only a
subset of the products they sell, in theirs, they neither advertise the prices nor the products they sell. Rather,
￿rms advertise for instance, their size. Also, in Bagwell and Ramey, product di⁄erentiation is unimportant.
4Firm 1￿ s good k is an imperfect substitute for ￿rm 2￿ s good k;k = 1;2.
5We get around this problem by assuming that consumers expect ￿rms to charge the same price for the
unadvertised product. This e⁄ectively rules out shopping at both stores.
3compete for the fully informed consumers.6
Let p11 and p21 denote ￿rm 1 and respectively, ￿rm 2￿ s advertised prices and let pE
12 and
pE
22 denote the expected prices of the unadvertised products (The ￿rst subscript denotes the
￿rm while the second denotes the product). There are three possible con￿gurations of the






22: In the second and third con￿g-
urations, the analysis gets complicated (see Appendix B.). For what follows, we suppose
consumer expectations are such that pE
12 = pE
22: Lemmas 1 and 2 below greatly simplify the
construction and respectively, structure of the demand functions.
Lemma 1 If pE
12 = pE
22, fully informed consumers will buy both goods from a single ￿rm.
Proof. Let pE
12 = pE
22: Suppose, without loss of generality, that p11 ￿ p21: In either case
(p11 = p21 or p11 < p21), for any consumer x 2 (0;1); buying from both ￿rms involves a
cost t whereas buying from ￿rm 1 only involves a cost tx < t: It follows therefore that the
consumer at x will buy both goods from ￿rm 1 rather than buying from both ￿rms. Hence,
no consumer will buy from both ￿rms.
Lemma 1 is intuitive. If it is costly to visit a store, a necessary condition for fully
informed consumers to shop around is that each ￿rm quotes the lowest price in exactly one
of the products ￿with no tie.
Fully informed consumers purchase from whichever ￿rm gives them the greatest surplus.
A consumer located at x 2 (0;1) gets surplus v1 + v2 ￿ p11 ￿ pE
12 ￿ tx buying from ￿rm 1
and surplus v1 + v2 ￿ p21 ￿ pE
22 ￿ t(1 ￿ x) buying from ￿rm 2. Let b x denote the location
of the indi⁄erent consumer. Then, ￿rm i faces demand b x = (pj1 ￿ pi1 + t)=2t from the
fully informed consumers. For partially informed consumers, demand is determined (only)
by individual rationality. Let yi denote the location of a consumer who receives only ￿rm
i￿ s ad(s). Buying yields surplus v1 + v2 ￿ pi1 ￿ pE
i2 ￿ tyi while not buying yields surplus
zero. Firm i thus faces demand e yi =
￿
v1 + v2 ￿ pi1 ￿ pE
i2
￿
=t from the partially informed
consumers (where e yi denotes the indi⁄erent consumer).7





v1 + v2 ￿ pi1 ￿ pE
i2
￿
=t + ￿j (pj1 ￿ pi1 + t)=2t
￿
;i 6= j:
6In an appendix available from the author on request, we provide a necessary condition for ￿rms to
compete for the fully informed consumers.
7However, if v1+v2￿pi1￿pE
i2> t; all consumers who receive at least one ad from ￿rm i will make a
purchase, that is, e yi= 1:
4Let p = p12 = p22 be the equilibrium price of the unadvertised good. We make the
following "intuitively obvious" assumption.
Assumption A1 p ￿ maxfp11;p21g:
Assumption A1 simply says that the unadvertised price cannot be lower than the ad-
vertised price. If it were, the ￿rm would be better o⁄ advertising that price instead, since
consumers￿visitation decisions are predicated on the advertised price. An immediate con-
sequence of Assumption A1 is that;
Lemma 2 If consumers expect ￿rms to charge the same price for the unadvertised good,
then, in equilibrium, ￿rms will charge the reservation price. That is, if pE
12 = pE
22;
then p = v2:
Proof. Let p be the equilibrium pro￿t maximizing price of the unadvertised good. Suppose,
contrary to the lemma, that p 6= v2: To start with, suppose p < v2 and that price is
continuous. Then, 9" > 0 : p = p+" < v2: Since consumers have unit demands, the demand
that each ￿rm faces is independent of the price of good 2 (the unadvertised price). Therefore,
for any ￿rm i with advertised price pi1 and for any " > 0; ￿i (pi1;p + ") > ￿i (pi1;p): In
other words, p is not pro￿t maximizing ￿a contradiction. Hence, we must have p > v2:
However, for p > v2; visiting consumers only buy the advertised product. In fact, for any
" > 0; ￿i (pi1;v2 + ") < ￿i (pi1;p); for any p 2 (maxfp11;p21g;v2]: Hence, p > v2 is not
pro￿t maximizing ￿a contradiction. Hence, it must be the case that p = v2:
What Lemma 2 says is the following; If consumers expect ￿rms to charge the same price
for the unadvertised good, then, the only equilibrium price that satis￿es those expectations
is p = v2: Given Lemma 2, ￿rm i￿ s demand reduces to




(v1 ￿ pi1)=t + ￿j (pj1 ￿ pi1 + t)=2t
￿
;i 6= j:
We label the above model Standard (S) when ￿rms each sell a single product and di⁄er-
entiation is low. When instead, ￿rms each sell two products, we label the model Regime L
(L) when di⁄erentiation is low and Regime H (H) when di⁄erentiation is high.
53 Analysis
In subsection 3.1, we jointly analyze the Standard model and regime L. To this e⁄ect, we let
r denote the regime (S or L) and let I be an indicator variable such that I = 0 if r = S and
I = 1 if r = L: In subsection 3.2, we study the case of high di⁄erentiation and in subsection
3.3, we give a summary of our main ￿ndings.
3.1 Low Di⁄erentiation
When v1￿pi1 ￿ t; all consumers who receive at least one ad make a purchase. In particular,
the partially informed consumer who travels the longest distance (the whole unit interval)
gets non-negative surplus.8 Thus, e yi ￿
v1￿pi1
t = 1: We make the following assumption;
Assumption A2 c +
p
2at < minfv1;v2g:
Assumption A2 is needed to ensure that, in equilibrium, consumers visit the stores in
the single product case. If the equilibrium price is greater than or equal to minfv1;v2g;
visiting consumers get negative surplus since they incur some positive transportation costs
and hence no consumer would visit a store.9
Let p21 and ￿2 be the advertised price and respectively, advertising level chosen by ￿rm
2. Since p12 = v2; ￿rm 10s behaviour is described by
(2) ￿1 = max
p11;￿1
(p11 ￿ c + I (v2 ￿ c))￿1 [1 ￿ ￿2 + ￿2 (p21 ￿ p11 + t)=2t]￿a￿
2
1=2:
The ￿rst order conditions, evaluated at the symmetric equilibrium: pr;￿
r are;
(￿p = 0) pr ￿ c + I (v2 ￿ c) = (2t ￿ t￿
r)=￿
r (3)
(￿￿ = 0) pr ￿ c + I (v2 ￿ c) = 2a￿
r=(2 ￿ ￿
r): (4)
8See Appendix A for the derivation of limits to the region of low di⁄erentiation.
9This assumption is implicit in the analyses of, for example, Bagwell (2003; Section. 5), Tirole (1988;
Chap. 7) and Soberman (2004).
6It is immediate from (3) that higher advertising is associated with lower advertised prices.
Solving (3) and (4) yields;
pr = c +
p









and substituting (5) and (6) into (2) gives







The advertised price is given by pS = c +
p




2at ￿ v2 = pS ￿ (v2 ￿ c) < pS in regime L (I = 1). That is, ￿rms advertise lower
prices when they sell multiple products but only advertise a subset. Although consumers
pay the reservation price for the unadvertised good in regime L; the advertised price is lower
as competition is more intense.
Observe that ￿S = ￿L in (7), that is;
Proposition 1 When ￿rms advertise only a subset of their products, equilibrium pro￿ts are
invariant with respect to an increase in the number of products.
This is explained by the fact that when each ￿rm carries multiple products, but only
advertises a subset, the ability to extract the entire consumer surplus on the unadvertised
good raises the incentives to increase store tra¢ c. This leads ￿rms to o⁄er price reductions
on the advertised good. Price cutting continues until the loss from price reductions equals
the gain from the sale of the unadvertised good ￿hence pro￿ts are invariant.
Our invariance result resembles a standard ￿nding in the switching costs literature. In
fact, our model can be reinterpreted as a two period model in which consumers have switching
costs and each ￿rm sells a single product in each period. Firms o⁄er bargains to entice
consumers followed by rip-o⁄s when consumers are locked in and the ￿erce competition for
market share in the ￿rst period may totally dissipate potential pro￿ts from exploiting locked
in consumers (Klemperer, 1987).10
10However, in equilibrium, consumers are not fooled. They know they are going to be ripped. Because
￿rms cannot commit to not ￿eece consumers once they are locked in, they have to o⁄er price discounts as a
way to commit to leave consumers su¢ cient surplus to make the relationship (shopping trip) worthwhile.
73.2 High di⁄erentiation
We say that di⁄erentiation is high if, given the prices, at least one partially informed con-
sumer does not make a purchase. Under high di⁄erentiation, the degree of product di⁄er-







and the demand that ￿rm i faces is given
by equation (1) exactly.11




(p11 + v2 ￿ 2c)￿1 [(1 ￿ ￿2)(v1 ￿ p11)=t + ￿2 (p21 ￿ p11 + t)=2t]￿a￿
2
1=2:
The ￿rst order necessary conditions for an equilibrium are;








































Equation (10) gives the equilibrium price as a function of the advertising intensity. Due
to complexity of the ￿rst order conditions, we cannot explicitly solve for pH
1 and ￿
H: Sub-

















is the ￿rm￿ s total revenue when its reach is ￿
H:
11In regime H; we have that t=2 < v1￿p < t: Intuitively, the condition says that for all possible equilibrium
prices, the consumer located at x = 1=2 ￿nds it pro￿table to purchase while the partially informed consumer
who travels the entire unit distance ￿nds it not pro￿table to purchase. The ￿rst inequality, evaluated at the
full information (highest) price, gives the upper bound to regime H while the second inequality gives the
lower bound. Evaluating this condition at pH











L and ￿L (pH
1 ;￿
H and ￿H) are respectively the equilibrium advertised
price, advertising and pro￿t under low (high) di⁄erentiation. We summarize equations (5)
and (10) below;
Proposition 2 Let v1 = v2 = v: When ￿rms advertise only a subset of their products, the
advertised good is priced below cost when di⁄erentiation is low but is priced above marginal
cost when di⁄erentiation is high. The unadvertised good is priced at its reservation value.





2at￿(v ￿ c): Clearly, pL
1 < c if and only
if
p
2at￿(v ￿ c) < 0 and
p
2at￿(v ￿ c) < 0 if and only if c+
p
2at < v. But this is nothing
other than Assumption A2. Hence, we conclude that indeed pL
1 < c: Second, di⁄erentiation
is high if the di⁄erentiation parameter, t; is such that v ￿ c < t < 4
3 (v ￿ c): Let t = v ￿ c:
Notice that (from (10)) @pH
1 =@t > 0. Therefore, let pH
1 ￿ pH
1
￿ ￿t=t : Then, pH
1 = c: Since
t > t = v ￿c; it follows that pH
1 =
￿









1 = c: The proof
of the second part of the result is given in Lemma 2.
This result is intuitive. Since consumers do not search, market shares are determined
solely by the advertised prices. Holding the ￿rm￿ s advertising reach constant, the lower the
advertised price the greater the likelihood that each ad received results in a sale. When
di⁄erentiation is low, a ￿rm that successfully undercuts a rival can substantially increase
its market share. Moreover, since ￿rms can rip-o⁄ visiting consumers on the unadvertised
good, they compete more aggressively for market share and thus end up pricing below cost.
When di⁄erentiation is high however, price advertising is primarily informative. Products
are less similar and therefore price di⁄erences have to be large to induce consumers to switch
to the distant supplier. Hence there is less rationale for pricing below cost.
An example of a market in which di⁄erentiation is generally low is the grocery retail
market. Supermarkets, for instance, sell products that are almost (if not exactly) physically
similar. Competition therefore is mainly on prices. With similar products, consumers do
not have a strong inclination to buy from a particular store (consumers are "footloose")
and as a result, price competition is intense. The presence of an unadvertised good only
exacerbates the price competition. This leads to lower advertised prices.
Observe that our loss-leader pricing result di⁄ers from that of Lal and Matutes (1994). In
Lal and Matutes, equilibrium advertised prices may well exceed marginal cost. In contrast,
9in our model, for all parameter values, the equilibrium necessarily entail advertised prices
below marginal cost when di⁄erentiation is low. Proposition 2 thus allows us to pin down
the su¢ cient conditions for loss-leader pricing. As a corollary, we have;
Corollary 1 When ￿rms each sell two products with the same reservation price, the fol-
lowing conditions are su¢ cient for loss-leader pricing; (i) Low di⁄erentiation and (ii)
Firms advertise only a subset of their products.
Next we consider the case when reservation prices di⁄er, that is, v1 6= v2: We summarize
the results below;
Proposition 3 Let v1 6= v2. If t < v1+v2￿2c
2 and ￿rms advertise only a subset of their
products, the advertised good is priced below cost irrespective of whether ￿rms advertise the
low or the high reservation price good.
Proof. (The proof mimics that of Proposition 2 above).
When ￿rms advertise the low reservation value good, competition for market share is
tougher as the ￿rm that succeeds in attracting more consumers will sell more units at the
higher unadvertised (reservation) price. The larger the di⁄erence between the reservation
prices the greater the incentive to undercut. Coupled with the fact that di⁄erentiation is
low, this leads to a much lower equilibrium advertised price. When ￿rms advertise the
high reservation price good instead, there are two opposing e⁄ects. On the one hand,
low di⁄erentiation induces ￿rms to compete more aggressively for market share. On the
other hand, ￿rms realize that visiting consumers will pay a lower (reservation) price on the
unadvertised good and this restrains the aggression. However, the low di⁄erentiation e⁄ect
dominates and ￿rms advertise prices below marginal cost in either case.
As a corollary to Proposition 3, we have the following;
Corollary 2 When products have di⁄erent reservation values, ￿rms are indi⁄erent as to
which good to o⁄er as a loss-leader.







We showed earlier (Proposition 2) that when ￿rms sell products with the same reservation
value, loss-leader pricing obtains only when di⁄erentiation is low. Does this hold in general?
It turns out that loss-leader pricing is possible under high di⁄erentiation. More precisely,







and v1 6= v2: When reservation values are
su¢ ciently di⁄erent, equilibrium may entail loss-leader pricing when ￿rms advertise the low
reservation price good. However, when ￿rms advertise the high reservation value good, the
advertised price exceeds marginal cost for all parameter constellations.
Proof. Let ￿rms advertise good i so that pH
i is the advertised price. Notice that (from (10))
@pH
i =@t > 0: Since t > t = v1+v2













2 ;i;j = 1;2;i 6= j: If vi < vj; advertising good i (the low reservation
price good) gives pH




and for jvi ￿ vjj large, pH
i < c:








; most partially informed consumers make a purchase and thus
competition for market share can be intense. Moreover, a higher unadvertised price adds
to the incentives to compete vigorously. Thus, when ￿rms advertise the low reservation
price good, undercutting may result in prices below cost. However, when the di⁄erentiation
parameter is su¢ ciently large, the incentive to undercut is reduced. Hence, for large t; ￿rms
advertise prices above marginal cost when they advertise the low valuation good. When
￿rms advertise the high reservation price good however, it is never optimal to advertise
prices below marginal cost. The fact that di⁄erentiation is high (products are less similar)
and the fact that the unadvertised (reservation) price is lower when ￿rms advertise the high
reservation price good both induce ￿rms to advertise higher prices.
The above results allow us to rationalize the "surprising" ￿nding of Walters and MacKen-
zie (1988) that, in retail markets, loss-leader pricing fails to stimulate store tra¢ c and hence
is unpro￿table. Walters and MacKenzie interpret their ￿nding as "pointing to the fact that
locational convenience and overall price perceptions are more important determinants of
patronage than weekly specials" (p. 60). We turn their explanation on its head. Because
di⁄erentiation is typically low in the retail sector, weekly specials are crucial determinants
of visitation. As a result, a ￿rm that o⁄ers such specials would substantially increase its
market share if rivals would not follow suit. Realizing this, ￿rms always try to match price
cutting by rivals and this enables them to maintain their market shares.
This is a typical prisoner￿ s dilemma. A ￿rm that succeeds in undercutting its rival can
greatly increase its pro￿ts since it then faces a large demand and sells the unadvertised good
11at its reservation price. On the other hand, if both ￿rms undercut (symmetrically), then
each ￿rm maintains its market share. In this sense, undercutting is a (weakly) dominant
strategy for each individual ￿rm. However, this strategy does not maximize joint pro￿ts
and ￿rms settle for an equilibrium with low advertised prices but with the same level of
demand.12 This makes loss-leader pricing appear as if it were less important.13 We ￿nd our
argument more convincing, for if price specials were unimportant, why are retailers placing
greater emphasis on hotter price specials? (Lal and Matutes, 1994; p. 345).
We next highlight the interaction between advertising and prices. One of the features
that distinguish our model from the models of Lal and Matutes (1994) and Ellison (2005) is
that with regard to information, consumers are ex-post heterogeneous ￿some receive ads and
some don￿ t. In Lal and Matutes and respectively, Ellison, all consumers are fully informed
as regards to the advertised prices. Below we compare the "equilibrium advertised" prices
to the "full information" prices.14
Proposition 5 Let pL
1F (pH






The full information price is t+2c￿v2 in both regimes. Note however that prices under
low and high product di⁄erentiation are not directly comparable since the ratio of t to v is
di⁄erent in the two regimes. Under full information and low di⁄erentiation, the equilibrium
of our model collapses to that of Lal and Matutes (1994). However, because our model is
an extension of the single product models of Grossman and Shapiro (1984) and Soberman
(2004), we can (conclusively) show that the advertised good is priced below marginal cost
whereas Lal and Matutes cannot.15
12That loss leader pricing does not increase demand is a consequence of the unit demands assumption.
With downward sloping demands, total demand can increase in equilibrium but market shares will not.
13Since competitors always match price cutting by rivals, the full e⁄ect of loss leader pricing on store
tra¢ c and pro￿ts is never realized in equilibrium. This gives a biased reading of the importance of loss
leader pricing. This suggests a di⁄erent empirical method to test for the e⁄ect of loss leader pricing ￿
counterfactual analysis. What would be the e⁄ect on pro￿ts of ￿rm i were competitors to not reciprocate
when ￿rm i lowers its price?
14By full information, we mean that every consumer in the market is aware of the advertised prices (￿ ! 1).
We reserve the term "perfect information" for the case where all consumers are fully informed of all prices.
15The equilibrium in the single product case provides su¢ cient restrictions on the parameters to enable us
to fully characterize the equilibrium in the multiproduct case. More precisely, in the single product case, the
equilibrium price is given by: pS= c+
p
2at: Since the reservation price for this good is v and ￿rms advertise
to inform consumers, pS= c+
p
2at is an equilibrium price only if pS< v: For, if pS￿ v; no consumer will visit
a store when faced with positive transport costs. Letting marginal cost equal zero (as in Lal and Matutes),
the equilibrium advertised price in our two good model is pL
1 = t ￿ v (same as in Lal and Matutes): But
since
p
2at< v (from the single product model) and a > t=2; it follows that t < v: Hence, pL
1 = t ￿ v < 0 =
marginal cost.
12When di⁄erentiation is low, the equilibrium advertised price exceeds the full information
price. The reason is that when the market is covered, demand is less elastic in the presence
of informational product di⁄erentiation (Bagwell, 2003; p. 75). This informational di⁄er-
entiation takes the form of some consumers being informed of the prices at only one of the
stores. Because demand is less elastic, ￿rms can a⁄ord to charge higher prices.
In contrast, the full information price exceeds the equilibrium advertised price when the
market is not covered. In this case, demand is more elastic in the presence of informational
product di⁄erentiation. Thus imperfect information increases ￿rms￿market power when
di⁄erentiation is low but decreases ￿rms￿market power when di⁄erentiation is high. In other
words, the e⁄ect of improvements in information depends on the di⁄erentiation regime ￿a
point that appears to have eluded the literature (Soberman (2004) is an exception). Below
we characterize the relationship between the advertised prices and the advertising intensity.
Corollary 3 An increase in advertising is associated with lower (higher) advertised prices
when di⁄erentiation is low (high).
Proof. @pL
1 =@￿ = ￿2t=￿
2 < 0 and @pH
1 =@￿ = 4
￿





This result has equivalences in Soberman (2004; Propositions 1 and 2). When di⁄eren-
tiation is low, demand by partially informed consumers is price inelastic while demand by
fully informed consumers is price sensitive. An increase in the advertising intensity raises
the share of fully informed consumers (reduces informational di⁄erentiation) in the market
and this puts pressure on prices. When di⁄erentiation is high however, partially informed
consumers are more price sensitive compared to fully informed consumers. Thus higher
advertising, by increasing the share of fully informed consumers, reduces overall demand
elasticity and thus enables ￿rms to charge higher prices.
Although we cannot solve explicitly for the optimal advertising level under high di⁄eren-
tiation, a numerical exercise shows that both the advertising intensity and pro￿t decrease as
the advertising cost, a; increases. There are at least three channels by which an increase in
the advertising cost propagates itself into lower pro￿t. Firstly, an increase in the advertising
cost directly increases the advertising outlay and hence lowers pro￿t. Secondly, an increase
in the advertising cost reduces the advertising level and this directly lowers demand and,
other things equal, lowers pro￿t. Thirdly, an increase in the advertising cost, by reducing the
advertising intensity, leads to lower advertised prices (Corollary 3) and hence lower pro￿t.
13Figure 1 plots pro￿t as a function of the advertising intensity, for di⁄erent values of a.
Figure 1. Pro￿t as a function of the advertising intensity, for di⁄erent values of a:
(v = 1;c = 0;t = 1:1; a = :6 (highest curve); a = 1:4 (intermediate curve); a = 2:5 (lowest
curve)).
We summarize the above observations in the following statement:
Remark 1 First, for a given advertising intensity, pro￿t increases as the advertising cost
decreases. Second, as the advertising cost decreases, the optimal advertising level in-
creases and moreover, pro￿ts become less sensitive to small perturbations in the adver-
tising intensity. That is, the pro￿t function becomes ￿atter in the neighborhood of the
optimal advertising level.
4 Welfare
We consider the welfare implications of informative advertising when ￿rms advertise only a
subset of their products. We restrict ourselves to the case of low di⁄erentiation.16
4.1 Market Equilibrium
To start with, we consider welfare in the market equilibrium. We de￿ne welfare as the sum
of total pro￿ts and consumer surplus. As we saw in Proposition 1, pro￿ts do not change
when ￿rms move from the single to the multiproduct con￿guration. Hence,
16We cannot compare the optimal outcome to the equilibrium outcome under high di⁄erentiation because
the regions of t consistent with partial market coverage do not intersect.
14Proposition 6 When ￿rms increase the number of products they sell, but only advertise a
subset, consumer surplus (and hence welfare) increases.
Proof. ￿
L = ￿
S and ￿L = ￿S but pL < pS
Intuitively, introducing the second good intensi￿es competition for market share and this
generates spillovers for consumers (in the form of lower prices).
4.2 Social optimum
Suppose the ￿rms studied above are instead run by a benevolent planner. The objective of
the planner is to maximize welfare. We derive the socially optimal advertising levels for the
single and multiproduct cases.
Let each ￿rm o⁄er n products; n 2 f1;2g. For consumers who receive ads from both
￿rms (measure ￿
2), the average transportation cost is t=4: Because each good is priced at
marginal cost, c; the average net bene￿t per consumer is n(v ￿ c) ￿ t=4:17 For consumers
who only receive a single ad (measure 2￿(1 ￿ ￿)), the average net bene￿t per consumer is
n(v ￿ c) ￿ t=2: The planner chooses the advertising level, ￿; to maximize,
Wn = ￿
2 (n(v ￿ c) ￿ t=4) + 2￿(1 ￿ ￿)(n(v ￿ c) ￿ t=2) ￿ a￿
2
where Wn is the welfare when each ￿rm o⁄ers n products. This gives,
(11) ￿
Social
n = (4n(v ￿ c) ￿ 2t)=(4n(v ￿ c) + 4a ￿ 3t)
(12) Wn = (2n(v ￿ c) ￿ t)
2 =(4n(v ￿ c) + 4a ￿ 3t):
An important policy question concerns the welfare e⁄ects of changes in the cost of ad-
vertising and how that relates to the number of products o⁄ered. We have that:
Proposition 7 An increase in the cost of advertising lowers welfare and the e⁄ect on welfare








Proof. The ￿rst part of the proposition follows immediately from (16). As for the second
17Marginal cost pricing ensures that there is no consumption distortion and hence maximizes welfare.






￿ ￿ if and
only if 2s(4a ￿ t) > 0: Since a > t=2 (by assumption), the result follows immediately:
The ￿rst part of the proposition is due to Grossman and Shapiro (1984). Since price
equal marginal cost, apart from raising the advertising outlay, an increase in the cost of
advertising lowers the socially optimal level of advertising. These two (higher advertising
outlay and reduced advertising intensity) both work to reduce welfare. For the second part
notice that since transport costs are independent of the number of products purchased from
any one supplier, surplus per visiting consumer increases with the number of products.
Since an increase in the advertising cost lowers the advertising level ￿which means fewer











￿ applies equally to the market outcome. Since welfare increases with
the number of products in the market equilibrium (Proposition 6), it follows that reducing
the share of informed consumers in the market lowers welfare more the larger the number
of products.
4.3 Market versus Planner
Below we compare the market determined to the socially optimal advertising level. The








optimal level is given by ￿
Social
2 = (8s ￿ 2t)=(8s + 4a ￿ 3t); s = v ￿ c: A divergence may






















decreasing in a and lima! t
2 ￿
L = 1 > lima! t
2 ￿
Social
2 ; clearly, in the interval (t=2;a1); it
must be the case that ￿
L > ￿
Social
2 : In the interval (a1;a2); ￿
L < ￿
Social




2 : Thus, from a social welfare perspective, the market determined advertising
level is excessive for a close to t=2, but too low for intermediate values of a.
However, if we ￿x a and s; so that both ￿
L and ￿
Social
2 are only functions of the dif-
ferentiation parameter, t; we get the result (due to Hamilton (2004; Proposition 2)) that:
Compared to the social optimum, the market undersupplies informative advertising for suf-
16￿ciently homogeneous brands but oversupplies advertising for more di⁄erentiated brands.
Below we attempt an explanation for this apparent divergence. First, by increasing the
number of products they sell, ￿rms create bene￿ts for all visiting consumers (Proposition 6).
However, ￿rms cannot appropriate the bene￿ts so created (Proposition 1). This suggests
that ￿rms have lower incentives to inform consumers. Thus, compared to the social planner,
nonappropriability of consumer surplus leads ￿rms to undersupply informative advertising.
Second, when a ￿rm reaches a consumer who already has received advertising from the
competitor, there is, on average, realignment of consumers among ￿rms (the matching e⁄ect).
Fully informed consumers buy from the nearest store, thereby saving on transportation costs.
Firms do not care about this bene￿t and hence tend to underprovide informative advertising.
However, ￿rms care about business stealing. When a ￿rm reaches a consumer who already
has received advertising from a rival, the resulting realignment of consumers may create
business for the advertising ￿rm. If it does, the competitor loses v + pL ￿ 2c > t while the
consumer saves on average t=2 on transportation costs.18 This ad thus generates a welfare
loss from the social stand point. This suggests that the market determined advertising level
may be excessive. However, whether the market over or underprovides advertising depends
on which e⁄ect dominates.
We end this section with a caveat. As Ellison (2005; p. 619) notes: "Models ... with
unit demands are poorly suited to welfare analysis". This is because there isn￿ t much
consumption distortion in these models. Consumption distortion only takes the form of
changes in the number of consumers purchasing and changes in prices have no e⁄ect on
the quantity demanded by any individual consumer as long as the price is less than the
reservation price.19 With downward sloping demand curves, one expects that consumers
would buy more of the loss-leader (stocking) and less of the unadvertised good. Pesendorfer
(2002) provide evidence supportive of stocking. He ￿nds that demand for ketchup increases
sharply during the sale period but also falls sharply after the sale.20
18The competitor loses v ￿ c on the unadvertised good and pL￿c on the advertised good.
v + pL￿2c =
p
2at> t:
19I thank Jonas H￿ckner for this observation.
20This explains why many ￿rms tend to o⁄er limited quantities of the loss leader good, or to restrict the
quantity purchased of the loss leader by any individual consumer.
175 Concluding Remarks
We study price advertising when ￿rms advertise only a subset of their products. We ￿nd
some support for the empirical ￿ndings that price advertising a⁄ects advertised and unad-
vertised prices di⁄erently. We also pin down the su¢ cient conditions for loss leader pricing.
Based on this analysis, we provide a game theoretic (and coherent) explanation to the ￿nd-
ing of Walters and Mackenzie (1988) that loss leader pricing fails to increase store tra¢ c
and hence pro￿ts.
Welfare e⁄ects are as expected ￿welfare decreases as the advertising cost increases. One
drawback of our framework, especially for welfare, is the assumption of unit demands. A
complete welfare analysis of loss leader pricing requires consumers to have downward sloping
demands, so that the demand that each ￿rm faces depends on both the advertised and the
unadvertised prices.
Another worthy extension is to endogenize the choice of which products to advertise. This
would allow ￿rms to advertise di⁄erent products. Other extensions include generalizing the
model to more than two products.
18Appendix
Appendix A: Derivations of Limits to the region of Low
Di⁄erentiation
We want to derive restrictions on the di⁄erentiation parameter, t; that guarantee that the
market will be fully covered.21 That is, the consumer who travels the entire unit distance
￿nds it pro￿table to purchase. We proceed by showing that if the advertised price, pi1;
exceeds v1 ￿ t; ￿rm i￿ s pro￿ts can be increased by reducing the price to below or about
v1 ￿ t: In other words, the maximum price observed cannot exceed v1 ￿ t: Technically, if
v1 ￿ t is the maximum price, then, for pi1 > v1 ￿ t; we must have @￿1
@pi1 < 0: That is, any
price higher than v1 ￿ t yields lower pro￿t. Consider ￿rm 1:
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t (￿2 ￿ 2) < 0: That is, ￿rm i￿ s pro￿t is concave in own price. v1 ￿ t being the maximum
price consistent with full market coverage, it follows that @￿1
@p11 jp=v1￿t ￿ 0: @￿1
@p11 jp=v1￿t =
(￿ ￿ 2)(v1 + v2 ￿ 2c ￿ 2t) ￿ 0 only if v1 + v2 ￿ 2c ￿ 2t ￿ 0 () t ￿ v1+v2
2 ￿ c: Thus, for
t < v1+v2
2 ￿ c; prices higher than v1 ￿ t cannot be observed. That is, p + t ￿ v1 ￿which is
the condition for full market coverage when ￿rms advertise good 1.
Appendix B: Consumer Expectations and Purchase De-
cisions
We take up the issue of the purchase decisions of consumers given their expectations of the
prices of the unadvertised good. To recapitulate, there are three cases to consider; In case
i, pE
12 = pE
22 and this is the case studied in the paper; In case ii, pE
12 < pE
22 and in case iii,
pE
12 > pE
22: We consider only case ii since case iii is similar.
Let pE
12 < pE
22. Depending on the advertised prices, each fully informed consumer has
three options; (i) plan to buy both goods from ￿rm 1; (ii) plan to buy both goods from ￿rm
2 and (iii) plan to buy from both ￿rms.
21We closely follow Soberman (2004).
19Option i yields higher surplus than option ii if and only if 2v ￿ p11 ￿ pE
12 ￿ tx ￿ 2v ￿
p21￿pE
22￿t(1 ￿ x) () x ￿ b x =
￿
p21 + pE
22 ￿ p11 ￿ pE
12 + t
￿
=2t: Consumers with locations
x 2 [0; b x) plan to buy both goods at ￿rm 1 while those with locations x 2 (b x;1] plan to
buy both goods at ￿rm 2: Similarly, option i yields higher surplus than option iii if and only
if 2v ￿ p11 ￿ pE
12 ￿ tx ￿ 2v ￿ p21 ￿ pE
12 ￿ tx ￿ t(1 ￿ x) () x ￿ e x1 = (p21 ￿ p11 + t)=t:
Consumers with locations x 2 [0; e x1) plan to buy both goods from ￿rm 1 while those with
locations x 2 (e x1;1] plan to buy good 1 from ￿rm 2 and good 2 from ￿rm 1: This alternative
is viable only if p21 < p11: For, if p21 ￿ p11; you incur unnecessary travel expenses by
shopping from both stores. Similarly, option ii yields higher surplus than option iii if and
only if 2v￿p21￿pE
22￿t(1 ￿ x) ￿ 2v￿p21￿pE







Consumers with locations x 2 [0; e x2) plan to buy from both ￿rms while those with locations
x 2 (e x2;1] plan to buy both goods from ￿rm 2:
Suppose p21 < p11: If e x1 < b x < e x2, then all consumers with locations x 2 (e x1; e x2)
plan to buy good 1 from ￿rm 2 and good 2 from ￿rm 1: Therefore, ￿rm 1 faces demand



























The pro￿t function is a bit complicated. The ￿rst part constitute pro￿t from the captive
consumers while the second part constitute pro￿t from the fully informed consumers.
However, if e x2 ￿ e x1; then option iii is dominated and a generic consumer either buys both
goods from ￿rm 1 or from ￿rm 2: Firm 1 then faces demand b x =
￿
p21 + pE











￿1 (1 ￿ ￿2)






22Also notice that if p11< p12; then both goods are cheaper at ￿rm 1 and obviously, no consumer ￿nds it
worthwhile to buy from both ￿rms. That is, option iii is dominated.
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